University of Chicago Law School

Chicago Unbound
Coase-Sandor Working Paper Series in Law and Coase-Sandor Institute for Law and Economics
Economics
2001

Courts Should Not Enforce Government Contracts
Eric A. Posner
dangelolawlib+ericposner1@gmail.com

Follow this and additional works at: https://chicagounbound.uchicago.edu/law_and_economics
Part of the Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Eric Posner, "Courts Should Not Enforce Government Contracts" (John M. Olin Program in Law and
Economics Working Paper No. 132, 2001).

This Working Paper is brought to you for free and open access by the Coase-Sandor Institute for Law and
Economics at Chicago Unbound. It has been accepted for inclusion in Coase-Sandor Working Paper Series in Law
and Economics by an authorized administrator of Chicago Unbound. For more information, please contact
unbound@law.uchicago.edu.

CHICAGO
JOHN M. OLIN LAW & ECONOMICS WORKING PAPER NO. 132
(2D SERIES)

Courts Should Not Enforce Government Contracts
Eric A. Posner

THE LAW SCHOOL
THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO

This paper can be downloaded without charge at:
The Chicago Working Paper Series Index:
http://www.law.uchicago.edu/Lawecon/index.html
The Social Science Research Network Electronic Paper Collection:
http://papers.ssrn.com/paper.taf?abstract_id=281436

Courts Should Not Enforce Government Contracts
Eric A. Posner1
August 21, 2001

Abstract. Most scholars believe that courts should enforce government contracts,
though they disagree about the extent to which liability or damages rules should trade
off relevant considerations – the problem of governments holding up contractors, on the
one hand, and the problem of governments using contracts in order to defer costs to
future governments, on the other hand. These scholars, however, overestimate the
ability of courts to affect policy outcomes. Courts cannot increase the welfare of current
or future generations by enforcing government contracts. The reason is that enforcing
contracts can benefit future generations only by increasing the credibility of their
governments, but if the current government has not already tried to benefit future
generations by complying with contracts voluntarily, then it will offset the effect of an
adverse judgment by withdrawing value from the future using a policy instrument over
which courts have no control.

INTRODUCTION
In United States v. Winstar the Supreme Court held that the United States
government breached several contracts when Congress passed a law overturning
regulations that permitted purchasers of insolvent S&L’s to evade solvency
requirements.2 Each of these contracts involved a thrift and the Federal Home
Loan Bank Board, the government agency that regulated thrifts. One deal
illustrates the others. In 1983 the Bank Board entered an “Assistance Agreement”
with Winstar Corporation, in which Winstar purchased a failing thrift and the
Bank Board promised to permit Winstar to use an accounting gimmick so that the
transaction would not appear as a loss on Winstar’s balance sheet. As a result of
the accounting gimmick, Winstar could not be declared in violation of reserve
requirements even if the purchase of the insolvent thrift had just that effect. The
Winstar deal, and many others like it, were motivated by an ill-conceived Bank
Board policy of encouraging the consolidation of the thrift industry rather than
declaring it insolvent. When the house of cards collapsed a few years later,
Congress enacted the Financial Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement Act of 1989.
This package of reforms included a provision banning the accounting gimmicks
that the thrift regulators had authorized. The thrifts, holding companies, and
shareholders who relied on these gimmicks sued the U.S. government for breach
of contract, seeking in the aggregate $30 to $35 billion dollars in damages.
Despite the Winstar decision five years ago, only a few of the 140 cases have
1
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settled or come to a final judgment. The U.S. government is fighting the lawsuits
tooth and nail – the FDIC alone has already spent more than $400 million on
litigation and the Justice Department expects to spend $50 million annually over
the coming years.3
The Supreme Court treated the transactions between the Bank Board and
the thrifts loosely as contracts between private parties. The usual reason that
private parties enter contracts is to prevent hold up: if a buyer (for example) were
not bound by contract law to pay the agreed price for seller’s custom-made
widgets, then the buyer could extract a price concession from the seller after the
latter had made its investment; but if buyers had this power, sellers would not
enter contracts with them in the first place. Hold up problems plague government
contracts as well as private contracts, as the Court recognized. Denying the thrifts
a remedy “would make an inroad on [the Government’s] power [to make
contracts], by expanding the Government’s opportunities for contractual
abrogation, with the certain result of undermining the Government’s credibility at
the bargaining table and increasing the cost of its engagements.”4 Firms would not
make contracts with the government, or would make contracts only for a high
price, unless they were entitled to damages if the government breached.
Although the hold up problem besets both private and government deals, a
further problem arises only for government contracts. This is the problem of
intergenerational opportunism. This problem arises for the government, but not
for individuals, because the government represents the interests of a constantly
changing population, or the voters who prevail in periodic elections, rather than
having a single, time-constant interest itself. If courts enforce government
contracts, then earlier governments will enter contracts for the sole purpose of
binding later governments to the earlier governments’ policies. For example, a
conservative government might enter a large number of defense contracts – more
than it would if it were certain that it would stay in power – in the hope of binding
a future liberal government to a strong policy of defense. If the liberal government
cannot breach these contracts without paying high damages, it might purchase the
military hardware even though it would rather use funds for other purposes.
The Winstar Court overlooked the problem of intergenerational
opportunism. The plurality acknowledged that the Winstar contract raised the cost
of subsequent regulation but not that the cost would be born by a different
government.5 The dissent argued that enforcing government contracts could put
the budget in peril because of the improvidence of government officials, but again
did not mention that the Court’s holding creates a perverse incentive for
governments to externalize costs on later governments.6
3
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The academic critics have had to make this point. With no financial stake
in the health of the thrift industry and the expectation of leaving office in the near
future, officials chose to put off the S&L crisis rather than resolve it. The
regulations allowed regulators to avoid declaring that the thrift industry was
insolvent but did not solve the problem and in fact permitted it to get worse.
Forcing the government to pay damages for overturning bad regulations such as
these can only deter the government from correcting its earlier mistakes.7
What should the Court have done, according to the critics? Resolving the
tension between hold up and intergenerational opportunism is difficult, and there
are two proposals on the table. The first is to authorize courts to award limited
damages for breach of government contract rather than ordinary expectation
damages. The damages should be low enough to permit subsequent governments
to escape politically motivated contracts but sensitive enough to the contractors’
costs to prevent governments from holding up contractors too much.8 The second
proposal is to award damages for breach of government contract in cases in which
the government engages in the ordinary kinds of contracts that firms and
individuals do, and not to award damages for breach of government contracts in
which sovereignty is at stake.9 Under these views, the plaintiff thrifts in Winstar
should have obtained something less than the gains wiped out by FIRREA or, if
financial regulation is considered a sovereign power, nothing at all.
These arguments move beyond the Court’s analysis, but they have a flaw.
They assume that a court has the ability to maximize utility across generations.10
This assumption is false, and because it is false, courts should not enforce
government contracts.
Hold up, in the commentators’ eyes, justifies enforcement or partial
enforcement of government contracts. But if a court awards damages for breach
of a government contract, the prevention of hold up is not enjoyed by the current
generation. The contractor’s investment is sunk; the award itself is simply a
transfer. The award can benefit only future generations, and it does so indirectly
by making future contractors more willing to contract with future governments,
secure in the expectation that future courts will continue the policy of awarding
7
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damages for breach of government contract. The rub is that the decision to benefit
future generations can rest only with the current generation and their political
representatives, not with their judges. If the judges defy the current government’s
efforts to breach contracts, then the current generation will respond by
withdrawing benefits that it would otherwise be willing to confer on future
generations, in which case the judicial policy of enforcing contracts will make
everyone – present and future – worse off.
The argument, then, is that judicial enforcement of government contracts
against the will of the political branches is futile, or self-defeating. Courts cannot,
and should not, be agents of future generations. These arguments are presented in
Part II after a discussion of doctrine and the academic literature in Part I. Part III
relates the thesis to some other debates in legal theory. Part IV examines doctrine.
I. BACKGROUND
A. Doctrinal Preliminaries
At the outset it is necessary to clear up some ambiguities in the title and
thesis of this paper. The phrase, “Courts should not enforce government
contracts” – federal courts and federal government contracts except when
otherwise noted – has several possible meanings. (1) Courts should not have
jurisdiction over government contract disputes, with the consequence that the
victim of a breach by the government does not have the right to sue in court. (2)
Courts should have jurisdiction over government contract disputes, and should
resolve them, but should not provide a remedy of any sort. (3) Courts should
award a remedy but they should not order Congress to appropriate money in order
to pay damages; but courts could enjoin government officials from acting in ways
inconsistent with the victim’s contract rights or order government officials to pay
damages out of their own pockets, in which case Congress would probably
indemnify them. (4) Courts should award a remedy of damages against the
government and order Congress to appropriate money in order to pay the award.
This article argues that assuming that courts have the relevant
constitutional authority, they should refrain from exercising the powers under (3)
and (4), that is, the powers to compel Congress, directly or indirectly, to comply
with a government contract or pay damages. Further, with limited exceptions
courts should not have the power under (2) if, as a result of judicial resolution of a
contract dispute, Congress incurs a political cost from refusing to pay damages
even if it has the formal legal and constitutional power not to pay damages.
The doctrine is ambiguous, and more will be said about it in Part IV, but
for present purposes one should understand that this position contradicts aspects
of doctrine, and conventional wisdom among scholars. Under the Tucker Act,11
Congress has waived sovereign immunity for breach of contract claims, and
everyone agrees that this means that courts (usually the Court of Federal Claims,
11
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with appeal to the Federal Circuit, and then to the Supreme Court) have
jurisdiction over breach of contract claims, and that courts can and should resolve
these disputes, and declare a winner (meaning #2). Further, if Congress
voluntarily appropriates money for a reserve fund to be used to pay Tucker Act
claims, as it currently does, courts should award damages in the expectation that
the appropriation will be used to pay them. The problem arises if Congress refuses
to appropriate money to pay Tucker Act claims, or orders the disbursing agent not
to use money from the reserve fund to pay a particular judgment.
Under what will be called the “strong” interpretation, the victim of a
government breach of contract acquires a property interest – a “vested” contract
right – and if Congress refuses to pay damages, this amounts to a taking under the
Constitution, for which there is a judicial remedy.12 If this is true, the court might
enforce government contracts in sense #4. And even if the Supreme Court would
not order Congress to appropriate money, it might award damages against
officials or enjoin them to act consistently with the victim’s contract rights when
that is possible (meaning #3).13 If either of these statements describes the position
of the Supreme Court, the Court should withdraw federal jurisdiction over
government contract appeals or else (more pragmatically) strengthen doctrines,
such as sovereign immunity and the sovereign acts doctrine, that make it hard for
plaintiffs to obtain remedies against the government.
Under the weak interpretation, the Court cannot order Congress to
appropriate money to pay damages, because only Congress has the power to
appropriate under the Constitution.14 This would undermine meaning #4. Further,
the Court might refuse to order officials to pay damages for breach of contract, or
enjoin them to act consistently with the promisee’s contract rights, because the
officials are acting as agents of the sovereign rather than as persons acting ultra
vires. This would undermine meaning #3.15 Congress would be free to refuse to
pay damages in Winstar and the Winstar-related cases. If this is the law, it is
correct, but goes against the weight of scholarly commentary, which wants
Congress to pay damages for breach of contracts and takings.16
An intermediate interpretation is that although the Supreme Court cannot
formally compel Congress or its agents to pay damages, the Court’s resolution of
12

Lynch v. United States, 292 U.S. 571 (1934); cf. First English Evangelical Lutheran Church v.
Los Angeles, 482 U.S. 304, 316 n.9 (1987).
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14
See, e.g., Glidden Co. v. Zdanok, 370 U.S. 530 (1962), which suggests that the Court must rely
on the “good faith” of Congress in satisfying judgments against the United States government. See
also Reeside v. Walker, 52 U.S. 286, 290-91 (1850) (officer of United States cannot pay damages
award unless there is an appropriation by Congress); National Association of Regional Councils v.
Costle, 564 F.2d 583, 588-90 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (courts have no constitutional power to force
Congress to appropriate funds); and see generally Kate Stith, Congress’ Power of the Purse, 97
Yale L.J. 1343, 1392-96 (1988).
15
See Larson v. Domestic & Foreign Commerce Corp., 337 U.S. 682 (1949), and the discussion in
Louis L. Jaffe, Suits Against Governments and Officers: Sovereign Immunity, 77 Harv. L. Rev. 1,
36 (1963). For similar reasoning involving a state breach of contract, see Edelman v. Jordan, 415
U.S. 651 (1974).
16
See, e.g., Akhil Amar, Of Sovereignty and Federalism, 96 Yale L.J. 1425 (1987).
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a dispute in the victim’s favor makes it politically costly for Congress to refuse to
appropriate money to pay damages. The Supreme Court, on this view, has the
power to impose political costs on a Congress that breaches a contract or takes
property. If this is the current state of affairs, then the Court should withdraw
federal jurisdiction over government contract appeals or else make it harder for
plaintiffs to prove a breach of contract.
As should be clear, the doctrine is complex, and we will return to it in Part
IV.
B. The Academic View of Government Contracts:
Hold Up versus Intergenerational Opportunism
Conventional wisdom among academics holds that courts should enforce
private contracts in order to enable parties to attract investment in their projects.
Suppose, for example, that a buyer needs special custom made widgets for its
factory. Seller is capable of producing these widgets but it fears that if it produces
these widgets, Buyer will hold up Seller – that is, refuse to pay for them unless
Seller lowers the price. Because by assumption the widgets are custom made,
Seller cannot recover its investment by selling the widgets on the market, and
must submit to Buyer’s threat. But then Buyer will pay only a low price, one that
will not compensate Seller for the cost of its sunk investment. Anticipating this
outcome, Seller will not agree to produce the widgets in the first place. But if
Buyer can commit itself to paying the contract price by entering a legally
enforceable contract, the problem is solved. Seller will invest in the widgets and
depend on the courts to extract damages from Buyer if Buyer refuses to pay the
full price. The purpose of contract enforcement, then, is to protect a party’s
investment against hold up, so that parties can maximize the value of their joint
projects.17
Some authors have applied this argument directly to government contracts,
arguing that courts should enforce government contracts so that the government
cannot hold up those it contracts with.18 The Winstar Court also made this
argument, and observed correctly that if the government is permitted to hold up, it
will have trouble attracting contractors and have to pay them more.19 There is a
further consideration, however. In ordinary cases the party to the private contract
has the same identity at the time of entry into the contract and the time of
performance,20 whereas the government does not have the same identity at the
17

Although this theory of contract law is welfarist or “economic,” it should be noted at the outset
that the critique of government contract enforcement advanced in this paper does not depend on
any particular theory of contract law being true.
18
See Ronald J. Daniels and Michael J. Trebilcock, Private Provision of Public Infrastructure: An
Organizational Analysis of the Next Privatization Frontier, 46 U. Toronto L.J. 375 (1996); Richard
Epstein, Toward a Revitalization of the Contract Clause, 51 U. Chi. L. Rev. 703 (1984).
19
Winstar, 518 U.S. at 884.
20
Cf. Derek Parfit, Reasons and Persons (1984). If personal identity changes over time, then the
explanation for private contract enforcement must be that the early self has both sufficient
motivation to benefit the later self, and sufficient information about the later self’s interests
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time of entry and the time of performance. Call the government at the time of
breach (or performance) G2, and the government at the time of contract entry G1.
G1 and G2 are different entities, and this is what distinguishes the government
contract case from the individual contract case, where the individual is the same
person at time 1 and time 2.21
The problem with G2 being subject to a contract made by G1 is that G1
has an incentive to enact policies that benefit G1 at the expense of G2. The
standard example is debt: G1 borrows money to fund projects that benefit current
citizens, leaving G2 to foot the bill. If G1 is a conservative government, it might
borrow the money rather than raise taxes, so that a liberal G2 will have to fund
debt rather than social programs.22 But the problem of intergenerational
opportunism applies to other contracts as well. The regulatory contract at the heart
of the Winstar case is a possible example of a government – or regulators acting
on their own – putting off a problem rather than solving it, with the result that a
later government pays the bills for the malfeasance of an earlier government. And
even ordinary procurement contracts can be subject to intergenerational
opportunism. A conservative government might enter long-term military
contracts, for example, in order to bind future liberal governments, which would
rather go ahead and make the final payments on weapons they do not want very
much, than breach and pay damages.
For government contracts, then, hold up and intergenerational
opportunism are problems that must be addressed by courts. If G1 and G2 – or the
populations they govern – have similar interests, then the intergenerational
opportunism problem becomes less severe, and the hold up problem becomes
more significant. In that case, government contract enforcement would seem to be
less objectionable. If G1 and G2 have quite different interests, then
intergenerational opportunism becomes more objectionable. Thus, authors differ
on whether courts should enforce government contracts, and if so, how liability or
damages rules should be altered in order to account for opportunism. One might
argue that for practical purposes, or for certain kinds of contracts, G1 and G2 are
likely to differ enough to make contract enforcement unwarranted;23 or one might
argue that contracts should be enforced but damages reduced to reflect the interest
of G2.24

(compared to the government); then enforcement of contracts would be like deference given by the
government to parents, who are assumed to have sufficient motivation and information for taking
care of their children.
21
Several authors advance this position in the course of arguing that courts should not treat
government contracts in the same way that they treat private contracts. See Sterk, supra note __;
Dana and Koniak, supra note __; and Hadfield, supra note __. They have in mind a democratic
justification for sovereign immunity along the lines suggested by Harold J. Krent,
Reconceptualizing Sovereign Immunity, 45 Vand. L. Rev. 1529 (1992).
22
For evidence of this kind of behavior, see Per Pettersson-Lidbom, An Empirical Investigation of
the Strategic use of Debt, 109 J. Pol. Econ. 570 (2001).
23
See Dana and Koniak, supra note __.
24
See Wickelgren, supra note __.
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But the authors agree on most things. They agree that courts should attach
equal weight to the welfare of different generations, and they agree, implicitly,
that legislatures cannot adjust in response to courts’ decisions when these
decisions do not reflect the legislatures’ time preferences. These assumptions are
vulnerable to critique.
II. WHY COURTS SHOULD NOT ENFORCE GOVERNMENT CONTRACTS
A. The Futility Argument
The real problem with government contract enforcement has nothing to do
with intergenerational opportunism. The problem is that courts do not have
enough power to impose their time preferences on legislatures. Judicial
enforcement of government contracts, even if G1 and G2’s interests are the same,
can produce no benefit.
1. Some simplifying assumptions
Let us begin with very simple assumptions. Suppose that the government
is a perfect agent of the public; it does exactly what the public wants, with the
public interest conceived as some aggregation of citizens’ preferences. If the
government does what the public wants, then the interests or preferences of the
government must constantly change, because the public constantly changes with
births, deaths, immigration, emigration, and shifts in opinion, and because the
way that the public’s preferences are aggregated and incorporated in government
policy changes as political institutions evolve. One might say that the government
itself constantly changes, and not just after elections or when one official is
replaced with another. As the government changes it represents the current
generation of the public, not some aggregation of the interests of different
generations over time, except to the extent that future interests are incorporated in
the preferences of the current generation.
We must separate out the judiciary from this government, but we also
assume that the judiciary acts in a benevolent way. The question facing the
judiciary is whether it should treat government contracts the same as contracts
between private parties.
2. The intergenerational trust fund
To answer this question, we introduce the concept of the
“intergenerational trust fund.” The current generation benefits future generations
in many ways. It invests in bridges, canals, dams, levees, roads, and other
infrastructure with very long useful lives. It invests in universities and other
institutions that generate valuable intellectual property, when that value cannot be
captured by the current generation. It preserves large areas of the environment and
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restricts long-term pollution. It educates the young. It maintains high standards for
government service. It keeps government facilities in working order. It defends
itself against foreign invaders and tries to develop an international reputation for
firmness. Some of these benefits are capital investments and intellectual property,
and others are investments in the reputation of the government and its agencies,
but their common element is that, like any investment, they produce a return in
the future. Because of this, it is helpful to think of these investments as transfers
to an intergenerational trust fund whose value is distributed over time.
The intergenerational trust fund shares two important characteristics with
a private trust fund. First, a generation can draw down the capital of this fund as
well as augment it. For example, during a war a government might draw down the
fund by exploiting natural resources that have been set aside for future
generations. Second, the generation will make transfers to the trust fund in the
most efficient way. Ordinary individuals who set up trusts for the benefit of
others, have every incentive to deposit in the trust fund the welfare maximizing
mix of assets – cash, real estate, stock, bonds – given the settlor’s risk
preferences, the laws of finance, tax regulations, the beneficiary’s needs, and so
forth. Generations should likewise equalize the marginal benefit of each transfer
instrument: investing in natural resources to the point of diminishing returns, and
then switching to universities and the army. Even a very stingy generation will
choose the optimal mixture of instruments for transferring resources to the future.
One might ask why one generation cares enough about future generations
to want to invest in the trust fund. The reason is that future generations contain
both older versions of members of the current generation and the descendants of
the members of the current generation. Some people also feel benevolence for
future citizens to whom they are not related by identity or family. At the same
time, people discount their own future consumption, and also the consumption of
their children, and the future consumption of their children and others. That is
why it is reasonable to assume that each generation cares about its own
consumption at the current time (undiscounted) and the consumption of future
generations (discounted).
It is common today to argue that the present generation does not make
sufficient provision for the future. This argument might be true, but it should not
obscure the considerable value that is transferred. Wilderness preserves and
government integrity are important, but the greatest transfer to the trust fund
occurs unintentionally. This is the phenomenon of “value leakage” from one
generation to the next, the result of the impossibility of capturing the full value of
ideas whose exploitation must occur over time. A person who invents a useful
idea (like calculus) or product (like the polio vaccine) cannot capture the full
value of the invention because it cannot be exploited immediately and because
intellectual property rights do not give the inventor rights over the idea or product
for the length of its useful life. To be sure, the inventor might want such rights,
and be able to obtain laws that provide these rights, but no one tries to create such
intellectual property rights for the simple reason that the future would not obey
them and not much is at stake for the present in any event. The future would not
respect these rights and the present does not try to force the future to respect them
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because the future enjoys the undiscounted value of calculus or the polio vaccine
(a gigantic amount) whereas the present generations’ inventors would enjoy only
the discounted value (an infinitesimal amount after a few decades). Happily,
discounting helps the future when current generations produce things with longterm good effects; discounting’s bad reputation comes from scholarly
preoccupation with the current generation’s incentives to produce pollution and
other long-term harms.
Significant value leakage does not prove the existence of intergenerational
altruism; inventors would invent even if they were purely selfish. What is worth
observing is that the current generation chooses to make transfers above the value
that is leaking into the trust fund. That shows that the current generation is
altruistic toward the future, even if not as altruistic as some would like.
3. Government contract compliance as a transfer
to the intergenerational trust fund
Now let us turn to a government’s voluntary compliance with its own
contracts. Although people tend to think of this behavior as compelled by courts,
the truth is that voluntary government compliance with contracts does not differ
conceptually from any of the other instruments for making transfers to the
intergenerational trust fund.
To see why, imagine that G2 must decide whether to pay or repudiate a $1
million debt (including interest) incurred by G1 and owing to a particular creditor,
and that courts have no jurisdiction over this question.
G2’s decision will reflect the costs and benefits of paying the debt. The
cost of paying the debt is simply $1 million. The benefit from paying the debt can
be divided into two elements: the utility gain to the creditor and the enhanced
creditworthiness of the governments of future generations.
The transfer to the creditor is unlikely to be, in itself, an interest of G2.
Creditors are just ordinary people or institutions like banks, and G2 has no more
incentive to give money to them than it does to other ordinary people or
institutions. Governments often make transfers to the poor, but it is unlikely that
creditors are impoverished. Governments often make transfers to important
political supporters; but again it is unlikely that ordinary creditors are political
supporters, or if they are, that the transfers they receive are on account of the debt
that they hold.
The only real benefit from paying the debt is the enhancement of the
ability of future governments to borrow money. History shows that creditors will
refuse to lend money, or will lend money but charge high interest rates, to
governments that have defaulted on prior debts.25 Thus, G2’s decision comes

25

See Barry Eichengreen, Historical Research on International Lending and Debt, 5 J. Econ.
Perspectives 149 (1991). For models of sovereign debt default and repayment, see Herschel I.
Grossman and John B. Van Huyck, Sovereign Debt as a Contingent Claim: Excusable Default,
Repudiation, and Reputation, 78 Amer. Econ. Rev. 1088 (1988); Harold L. Cole, James Dow, and

Government Contracts

11

down to that of whether it should invest $1 million (by paying G1’s creditor) in
order to reduce the interest rate that G3 must pay on future loans.
If G2 makes this investment, we can think of the $1 million as a kind of
transfer to the future, though the future benefits in terms of access to credit rather
than receiving the $1 million directly. People in the current generation will not
value this access to credit as much as the future generations will; some
discounting will occur to reflect the fact that (a) members of the future generation
receive this benefit in the future, and (b) some members of future generations will
not be descendants of members of the current generation, and so less likely to be
the subject of ordinary intergenerational altruism. Thus, G2 will pay the debt if $1
million is less than the increase in the credit costs for future generations,
discounted to reflect G2’s altruism toward future generations.
Governments often pay their debts, and comply with other contracts, even
if they are not compelled by courts, as current practice and history show.26 In the
United States Congress had a good record of complying with government
contracts or paying “damages” long before it created a legal remedy. On
reflection, this is not surprising: governments constantly make promises to
citizens and foreign countries – they promise to pay for goods and services, enter
military alliances, promise aid after natural disasters, swear they won’t reduce
Social Security benefits or raise taxes – and frequently although not always keep
their promises, even though nothing constrains them other than their concern for
their reputations. This is why international credit markets function, and extend to
countries with weak judicial systems.27
4. The futility of judicial intervention
Governments have ample incentive to comply with contracts but they will
not invariably comply with contracts. The question is whether courts should force
a government to perform contractual obligations or pay damages when that
government would otherwise prefer to breach without compensating the victim.
Judicial enforcement of a government contract with a damages award has,
it is assumed, the same effect as voluntary compliance with that contract: it
transfers resources from the current generation to future generations. For that
William B. English, Default, Settlement and Signalling: Lending Resumption in a Reputational
Model of Sovereign Debt, 36 Inter’l Econ. Rev. 365 (1995).
26
See Eichengreen, supra note __, for a sketch of the history.
27
The famous repudiations of contracts have almost always occurred in the United States during
times of extreme stress: Lynch v. U.S., 292 U.S. 571 (1934), in which the U.S. government
repudiated insurance policies sold to soldiers during World War I, and Perry v. United States, 294
U.S. 330 (1935) in which the U.S. repudiated the Gold Clause in treasury bills, were depression
era. Most state repudiations after the early years of the Republic occurred during the turmoil in the
wake of Jackson’s war on the Bank, and, in the case of Southern states, during Reconstruction.
Most of the states that defaulted in the 1840s eventually repaid in full, despite the lack of a legal
remedy, apparently in order to persuade creditors to lend more to them. See William B. English,
Understanding the Costs of Sovereign Default: American State Debts in the 1840’s, 86 Amer.
Econ. Rev. 259 (1996).
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reason, judicial enforcement can be thought of as a way of augmenting the value
of the trust fund. But if, as we assume, the government is a perfect agent, and the
current generation has some degree of altruism for future generations, then the
government will choose the most efficient instrument, or combination of
instruments, for transferring to the future. But then if it chooses not to use one
instrument – namely, compliance or full compliance with government contracts –
then this particular instrument cannot be as good a way of making transfers as the
other instruments are.28
When the court awards damages against the will of G2, G2 will respond
by withdrawing value from the intergenerational trust fund, thus offsetting the
transfer into that fund effected by the court. G2 will, to be vivid, reduce the
funding of a university, or reduce the readiness of the military, or defer
maintenance on government facilities, or exploit another wetland or forest.
Because G2 cares about future generations, it will already have chosen the least
cost package of instruments for transferring value to the trust fund. If compliance
with a contract is not already in the package, it follows that it is less efficient than
the other instruments. Judicial enforcement of government contracts is in this way
futile, even worse than futile, because it forces the government to forgo an
efficient form of transfer and engage in a less efficient form of transfer.29 The
future is harmed because it receives less wealth, and the present is harmed
because it cares about the welfare of the future.
Consider the case of sovereign default on debt. Governments occasionally
default on their debt. The reason is usually that a powerful shock – such as a war
with another country – requires the government to sacrifice future credit for the
sake of present survival.30 It is hard to imagine domestic courts compelling a
government in the throes of an emergency to pay its creditors.31 If they did, surely
the government would (if it did not ignore the courts entirely) sacrifice some other
resource in order to make up for the deficit. It might exploit remaining natural
resources, seize property from citizens, dismember the universities, or ruin the
28

Assumed is the government’s ability to make incremental adjustments to the value of the
transfer – one dollar more or less to the environment, the military, and so forth.
29
One might ask why the political branches have priority, in the sense of being able to undo
judicial transfers to future generations, while courts do not have the power to undo political branch
transfers from future generations. It is theoretically possible that courts could enjoin the legislature
from reducing the size of wilderness areas, for example. But I assume that conflicts between the
judicial and political branches will ultimately be resolved in favor of the latter because the
political branches are more sensitive to the immediate interests of the public. (It is possible that a
broad-gauged application of equal protection doctrine to future generations, see R. George Wright,
The Interests of Posterity in the Constitutional Scheme, 59 Cincinnati L. Rev. 113 (1990), would
reverse this presumption, but it is hard to see how courts could enforce this doctrine given futility
problems without acquiring dictatorial powers encompassing, among much else, taxing,
borrowing, and spending powers.)
30
See Eichengreen, supra note __.
31
“The barons of the Exchequer cannot, as such, be conusant of the necessities of the state” (Lord
Somers in Bankers’ Case, 14 Howell, State Trials 1 (1812). Roosevelt was prepared to defy the
Supreme Court if it ruled against him in the Gold Clause cases. See William E. Leuchtenburg, The
Supreme Court Reborn 86-88 (1995).
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currency by adopting inflationary policies. If, as we assume, the government has
some altruism for future generations, then forcing it to pay its debts rather than
transfer value in its preferred way, can only hurt future generations. Unless the
court acquired dictatorial powers, took over the functions entrusted to the political
branches of the government, and then dictated the distribution of resources to
future generations, enforcement of the contract would be self-defeating.32
The futility argument rests on two main premises. The first is that welfare
across generations is at stake, not some special moral or political value. If it were
immoral for Congress to hold up contractors, then an award of damages could
vindicate a moral ideal. But it is not immoral to hold up contractors as long as
contractors understand that they take this risk, and indeed the academic and
judicial discussions of government contract cases assume that the court should
protect the welfare of the future, not a moral ideal.
The second is that courts are subject to institutional constraints. Courts
cannot dictate everything the government does; they can punish the government
only when it breaks a law. If a court tries to help the future by enforcing a
government contract, the government can respond by hurting the future through
some lawful instrument – reducing investment in the military, for example – over
which courts have no control.
5. The “reverse futility” objection
A common but incorrect response to the futility argument is that there is
futility in not enforcing government contracts as well. Let us call this the “reverse
futility argument.” Governments want to be able to make credible commitments,
and they can do this only (or most effectively) if an independent third party – the
judiciary – will impose a cost on the government if it violates its commitment. If a
commitment mechanism is not available, governments must use less efficient
mechanisms for accomplishing their goals: prepayment for a durable good, for
example, rather than a superior executory contract. Because the future would
benefit more from a contract than from the alternative mechanism, the future’s
courts should be willing to enforce contracts.
One should understand by now why this objection fails. If G2 wants G3 to
be able to make credible commitments, G2 must comply with its contracts, and it
32

This example will call to mind Ricardian equivalence, according to which there is no difference
between using taxes and budget deficits to fund projects: budget deficits just mean taxes later on
and the present generation will adjust. See Robert J. Barro, Are Government Bonds Net Wealth?,
81 J. Pol. Econ. 1096 (1974). The Ricardian equivalence version of the argument advanced in this
paper is that if courts enforce government contracts against the public interest, and the political
branches do not adjust by reducing the trust fund, then citizens will adjust by bequeathing less
wealth to their children. This view is discussed and criticized in Tyler Cowen and Derek Parfit,
Against the Social Discount Rate, at 157-58. My argument avoids the very strong assumptions
underlying Ricardian equivalence (on which see, e.g., B. Douglas Bernheim, A Neoclassical
Perspective on Budget Deficits, 3 J. Econ. Perspectives 55, 63 (1989)) by asserting that the
political branches adjust rather than citizens. Congress responds to judicial decisionmaking rather
than citizens responding to government decisionmaking.
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will, to the extent that such compliance efficiently benefits the future. But
governments do other good things besides making commitments. They also
preserve the environment and invest in technology. In certain circumstances a
government benefits the future more by doing these good things (at the margin)
than by complying with earlier commitments. A perfect government that wants to
transfer value to the future in the most efficient way will choose the most efficient
package of instruments for making this transfer – and that means some degree of
compliance with prior commitments though not necessarily perfect compliance. A
court that inserts itself into this process and imposes a cost on a government that
tries to preserve the environment rather than comply with an earlier commitment,
can only cause governments to choose a less efficient package of instruments for
transferring value to the future, and thus to transfer less value to the future.
People who make the reverse futility objection probably make the
assumption, barred for the moment, that the judiciary is more reliable in some
way than the government is. This assumption is barred because for the moment
the government is assumed to act as a perfect agent of the public. However, as
section C argues, relaxing this assumption affects the argument very little.
B. Frictions and Intergenerational Equity
A critic of the argument so far will object that the current generation
cannot instantly and continuously reduce the trust fund in order to offset the effect
of an award of damages on a government contract. The busy political branches
would not notice that a court had just awarded damages to a contractor, and even
if they did, would not stop whatever they were doing in order to reduce the
amount of wilderness set aside for future generations.
This objection has limited force. If courts enforce contracts that harm the
current generation, then these harms will be felt as budget reductions or as more
urgent problems that call for government intervention. With less money to spend
on the present or more urgent things to spend it on, the government will spend
less money on the future, and, because it is compelled to use an inefficient device
for transferring value to the future, the joint welfare of present and future will
decline. Although it is unclear as a theoretical matter how the government will
spread the burden between present and future, it is clear that the future can be
made no better off by judicial enforcement of a government contract. And all this
is true even if the government and the public do not know about the court’s
behavior. Adjustment is automatic.
The critic might persist that there are always frictions, and courts can
transfer value to the future in small increments. Perhaps if the government is not
paying attention, it will find itself with too little money for the present after
committing resources to the future, though it could just as well work out in the
opposite direction. This objection raises two more points.
Initially, recall the earlier observation that the current generation already
transfers value to the future. If the current generation does not seek to transfer
resources to future generations, then there is no reason why the judiciary should
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take it upon itself to make these transfers. This would be like the judiciary
preventing abortions or punishing criminals or deregulating industries or
redistributing wealth through low level fact-finding or law-making that the
political branches cannot detect.
One might respond that courts are authorized by the Constitution and
tradition to exercise independent moral judgment when making decisions. As long
as judges can transfer some resources to the future, they should do so, because it
is the right thing to do.
This brings us to the second point. The current level of intergenerational
transfer is not clearly too low – certainly not low enough that the courts have a
warrant to increase it against the will of the public. There are several reasons for
thinking this. As noted above, there is a significant amount of “value leakage”
from one generation to the next, and despite this value leakage, we observe
additional transfers to the future.33 Further, American history going back to the
Civil War displays a succession of increasingly wealthy generations. Each
generation enjoys a longer life expectancy, safer products, cleaner air and water,
more convenient goods and services, more stable political institutions, and
cheaper resources. Theories of intergenerational equity – which hold that the
distribution of resources should be independent of the time of birth34 – provide no
reason for believing that the selfishness of the current generation exceeds that of
the past, and thus for believing that future generations will do worse than the
present.35 The burden of proof lies with those who argue against the weight of
history, and is heavy for those who want the courts to defy the political branches
on the basis of a speculative injustice to the future.
C. Public Choice Concerns
The most implausible assumption made so far is that the government is a
perfect agent for the contemporary generation, but this assumption turns out to be
relatively unimportant.
If the government is not a perfect agent, how might its behavior change?
Public choice theory describes various possibilities, but the common thread is the
role of interest groups. Suppose, for example, that a court adopts a policy of
33

This point is frequently neglected; see Bruce Ackerman, Social Justice in the Liberal State 10738, 168-227 (1980); John Rawls, A Theory of Justice 284-93 (1971); and the essays in
Environmental Change and International Law (Edith Brown Weiss ed. 1992), Future Generations
and International Law (Emmanuel Agius and Salvino Busuttil eds. 1998), and Justice Between
Age Groups and Generations (Peter Laslett and James S. Fishkin eds. 1992).
34
See Rawls, supra note __, Ackerman, supra note __.
35
Cf. Richard A. Epstein, Justice Across Generations, 67 Tex. L. Rev. 1465 (1989); but see
Wright, supra note __ (arguing that generosity toward the future has declined). I do not want to
oversimplify this argument; there are many complexities (see, e.g., Stewart E. Sterk, Freedom
from Freedom of Contract: The Enduring Value of Servitude Restrictions, 70 Iowa L. Rev. 615,
635-39 (1985) (and citations therein); Stephen F. Williams, Running Out: The Problem of
Exhaustible Resources, 7 J. Legal Studies 165 (1978)); I only want to stress the uncertainty of the
case for intergenerational transfers, and urge that the burden of proof be shifted.
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enforcing government contracts when interest group pressures account for the
breach. As usual, we can identify two effects. First, in the current period the
award transfers revenues from taxpayers to the victim of the breach, and as
before, it is unlikely that the victim has a moral claim to this transfer. Second, the
award signals that in future periods courts will prevent governments from
violating contracts at the behest of interest groups. If this signal is credible, then
interest groups will become less enthusiastic about lobbying the government to
breach contracts. Because this policy would enable the government to commit
itself not to breach at the prompting of interest groups, while at the same time
permitting the government to breach contracts when required by the public
interest, it might seem to augment the trust fund.
But interest group arguments such as this one does not affect our argument
that government contract enforcement is futile. To see why, suppose G2 wants to
violate a contract because of the influence of an interest group. If G2 must pay
damages, then it can benefit the interest group by violating the contract and
paying damages to the victims. The interest group receives the benefit it seeks,
and the public must pay either out of current funds or the trust fund set aside to
benefit future generations. The public must pay in one way or the other, but G2
benefits by acting consistently with the interest group’s goals.36
There are two rejoinders to this argument. The first is that enforcement
benefits the future: assets withdrawn from the trust fund to pay the victims of the
breach have less value to a future government than the ability to commit itself to
perform a contract or pay damages. If a judicial policy of deterring interest group
motivated contract breaches reduces interest group influence, then future
generations will enjoy a more responsive government, one that will choose mainly
projects that maximize social welfare.
But if the current government can generate greater value for future
governments by complying with contracts than by submitting to interest group
pressure to breach, then it will comply with the contract in the absence of judicial
compulsion and give the interest group different assets otherwise bound for the
trust fund. Altruism for future generations drives the government to choose the
most efficient instrument for enhancing the value of the trust fund. The judiciary
need not play a role.
The second rejoinder is that contract damages operate as a tax on the
interest group deal in which G2 promises to breach the contract, and consequently
reduces the amount of interest group influence. But this argument assumes that
the initial contract – the one which the interest group is paying G2 to breach – is
unaffected by interest group activity. There is, however, no reason to assume that
the government behaves in the public interest when it makes contracts but not
when it breaches them.37
36

For a similar argument for takings jurisprudence, see Daniel A. Farber, Economic Analysis and
Just Compensation, 12 Int’l Rev. L. & Econ. 125 (1992); Daryl J. Levinson, Making Government
Pay: Markets, Politics, and the Allocation of Constitutional Costs, 67 U. Chic. L. Rev. 345 (2000).
37
Fischel and Sykes, supra note __. Cf. Epstein, Toward a Revitalization, supra note __, at 719
(“to allow a state to repudiate its contracts unilaterally, however, is to invite the very abuses of
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To understand this point, suppose that all government contracts have zero
social value and are simply transfers from the public to politically connected
firms. Suppose that firm 1 makes a contract with government 1; there is a new
election one generation later; and then firm 2 bribes government 2 to break the
contract with firm 1 and award that same contract to firm 2.
In a world with no contract enforcement, the possibility that a future
government will breach the contract reduces the value of the contract to firm 1.
Indeed, with no friction firm 1 can expect government 2 to hold it up for the entire
surplus of the contract, in which case no firm would enter a contract with the
government. But because these contracts are assumed to be bad, this would be a
good thing.
By contrast, in a world where courts do enforce contracts, firm 1 would
want to enter the contract. Because this contract is bad, we shouldn’t want courts
to enforce this contract, or indeed any contract.38 The intuition is that a contract is
a valuable thing, but if the government is driven entirely by interest group deals,
then it will award this valuable thing to an interest group, and not use it for the
benefit of the public. If that is true, then the public is best off if the government is
deprived of the ability to enter contracts.39
Let us consider a different public choice argument, namely, that rentseeking would be greater if courts did not enforce contracts. If contracts are
enforced, then the value of a contract is high, so firms will rent seek in order to
procure government contracts. If contracts are not enforced, firms will not rent
seek as much, but they will rent seek more often, every time there is an
opportunity to breach. Which regime creates greater social cost? Neither; each
regime will produce the same social cost, because firms compete away all the
rents, whether they are high (if the contract is enforceable) or low (if the contract
is not enforceable).40

factional coalition that the contract clause was designed to prevent, for we can be sure that almost
every repudiation will provide benefits to some groups at the expense of others.”).
38
This is essentially the argument made in Jonathan R. Macey, Winstar, Bureaucracy, and Public
Choice, 6 S. Ct. Econ. Rev. 173 (1998); and Wickelgren, supra note __, except that Wickelgren
emphasizes the countervailing hold up problem, which in his view justifies limited damages for
breach of contract by the later government, because he thinks that it is meaningful for courts to
maximize welfare across generations.
39
To the inevitable reply – what about takings?, should uncompensated takings be permitted? – it
is rarely observed that the just compensation rule assumes that the existing distribution of wealth
is itself not in large part determined by interest group activity. If it were, then the uncompensated
taking would not be as objectionable, because then it would appear to be a tax on the illegitimate
interest group activity that determined property rights in the first place. Now the idea that ordinary
government takings affect property that has been transferred to interest groups may or may not be
plausible – I don’t know. But it is surely plausible when we turn to government contracts – where
there is no reason to believe that the original contract party is more innocent than the second
contract party. In short, even if courts should force the government to pay for takings, it does not
follow that they should force the government to pay when it breaches a government contract
40
But see Fischel and Sykes, supra note __, at 342-44. They argue that each rule is superior in a
particular context.
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Yet another argument inspired by the magic dust of the public choice fairy
is that courts can distinguish government contracts that are interest group transfers
and those that are welfare maximizing, and they should enforce the second type of
contract and not the first. Fischel and Sykes advance a more sophisticated version
of this idea, according to which courts can divide government contracts broadly
into suspect and non-suspect classes. Contracts for an aspect of the government’s
sovereignty are suspect and should not be enforced. Contracts for proprietary
aspects are not suspect and should be enforced.
Neither of these assertions is persuasive. The first is beset by well known
problems. Because all government contracts will involve some interest group
activity, courts cannot police these contracts without taking the place of the
legislature and executive and making independent judgments about which
contracts are in the public interest and which are not.41 The second fares no better.
There is no reason to believe that one kind of contract or the other is more likely
the result of interest group activity. Probably all government contracts help both
the public and particular interest groups; just think of debt contracts, which can be
used to raise funds for national defense or to make payments to political
supporters.42
Finally, let us recall the reverse futility argument, which holds that it is
futile not to enforce government contracts, because earlier generations will
substitute to less efficient transfers to the future. There is a public choice version
of the reverse futility argument. Suppose G1 wants to bind G2 to a military
defense contract that benefits G1’s supporters but not G2’s. If courts at time 2
enforce this contract, then G1 will enter it. But if courts at time 2 do not enforce
this contract, G1 will substitute to less efficient interest group deals. For example,
it might pay partly in advance for large durable goods, aircraft carriers rather than
destroyers, leaving G2 little choice but to pay the remainder and accept delivery.
The problem with the reverse futility argument is that although inefficient
political transfers might be an unfortunate consequence of not enforcing
government contracts, it remains the case that the court at time 2 cannot affect
behavior at time 1 by choosing to enforce government contracts. If G1 believes
that G2 will feel compelled to honor the contract in order to maintain good
relations with contractors, then it will enter the contract; otherwise, it will not. But
if G2 refuses to comply with the contract, judicial defiance can only make things
worse. The benefit to G3 resulting from the availability of contracts rather than
41

Einer R. Elhauge, Does Interest Group Theory Justify More Intrusive Judicial Review? 101
Yale L.J. 31 (1991); Neil K. Komesar, Imperfect Alternatives: Choosing Institutions in Law,
Economics, and Public Policy (1994).
42
Gillian Hadfield argues that enforcing government contracts prevents the government from
singling out a particular person to bear the burden of a policy change. Hadfield, supra note __, at
527-28. And yet a contractor has a variety of means for protecting itself from breach – many more
than an individual in the takings context to which Hadfield draws an analogy. The contractor can
charge a premium, and use it to self-insure or purchase insurance, and it will have the proper
incentives when the government’s breach is caused by a change in circumstances rather than the
desire to hold up the contractor. The concern about singling out does not add anything to the
public choice arguments discussed above.
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less efficient instruments for making interest group transfers will be offset by
withdrawals from the trust fund.
In sum, public choice concerns do not justify judicial enforcement of
government contracts. Although this conclusion rests on some empirical
assumptions about the ability of courts to evaluate legislation – by contrast, with
the assumption of perfect government the argument is axiomatic – these
assumptions are reasonable.
D. Regulatory Agencies
The government is not a unitary body. Government contract disputes often
arise when an agency – say, the Department of Defense – refuses to perform its
side of a contract. Should a court force DOD to pay damages?
The futility argument depends on Congress’ residual power to move
resources between generations. Thus, if a court forced DOD to pay damages in
defiance of the current Congress’ wishes, Congress would adjust in a way that
hurt the future. The future’s gain – the ability of future DODs to make credible
commitments – would be offset by a withdrawal from the trust fund. In theory,
then, the court should defer to the current Congress’ wishes.
As a practical matter, however, courts have no reliable method for
ascertaining the desires of the current Congress except when Congress
incorporates those desires in a statute. Thus, when Congress by statute breaches a
regulatory agency’s contract, the court should not award damages. When the
agency breaches its own contract, and Congress remains silent, the Court should
defer to the agency’s authorizing statute, which is interpreted to permit the agency
to enter contracts, and thus (by implication) pay damages if it breaches them.
As an aside, it is worth observing that regulatory agencies, like courts,
should not try to maximize welfare across generations. This observation is not the
same as the argument that the logic of discounting does not apply to future
generations, and therefore the proper discount factor is 1 or something else
unrelated to the discount factor for payoffs in the near future.43 This argument
usually ends with a plea for agencies to take greater account of the future, not
less.44 On the contrary, the correct view is that agencies should attach no weight
to payoffs to be received by future generations in the absence of congressional
authorization. The reason should now be familiar: if agencies did weigh future
payoffs, then they would choose regulations that transfer value into the
43

See Thomas C. Schelling, Enforcing Rules on Oneself, 1 J.L. Econ. & Org. 357 (1985); R.M.
Solow, Intergenerational Equity and Exhaustible Resources, 41 Rev. Econ. Studies 29 (1974);
Tyler Cowen and Derek Parfit, Against the Social Discount Rate, in Justice Between Age Groups
and Generations, supra note __ .
44
Daniel A. Farber and Paul A. Hemmersbaugh, The Shadow of the Future: Discount Rates, Later
Generations, and the Environment, 46 Vand. L. Rev. 267 (1993) (arguing that obligations toward
future generations are ethical, not reducible to cost-benefit analysis); Richard L. Revesz,
Environmental Regulation, Cost-Benefit Analysis, and the Discounting of Human Lives, 99
Colum. L. Rev. 941 (1999) (similar).
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intergenerational trust fund, and Congress would react by withdrawing an equal
amount of value. Agencies, like courts, must defer to the social consensus on the
treatment of the future, as reflected in Congressional choices.
Lastly, it should be mentioned that the critique applies to all three kinds of
contract into which the government enters: procurement contracts, regulatory
contracts, and debt contracts. The scholarly critiques of Winstar direct their
attacks against government enforcement of regulatory contracts of the sort at issue
in Winstar.45 No one argues that courts should not compel the government to
comply with debt and procurement contracts. But they should not, and indeed it is
nearly impossibly to distinguish the three contracts: all concern the government
raising money and spending money, and the government can certainly use debt
contracts and its spending power to fund projects that it would otherwise
implement directly through regulatory contracts.46
E. States
Should federal courts force state governments to comply with their
contracts? If one takes state sovereignty seriously enough, the critique of judicial
enforcement of government contracts applies to state governments because state
governments in the federal system are sovereign just as the national government
is.
A familiar argument holds that the federal government should restrict the
behavior of states when that behavior has effects that spill over the borders with
other states. The canonical example involves pollution regulation – each state has
insufficient incentive to control air pollution that drifts across state lines – but it
could just as well involve government contracts. When a state government
decides whether to comply with a contract, it will account for the effect of the
breach on the ability of future generations to enter favorable contracts, but it will
discount to reflect migration. Of the future population that benefits from an earlier
government’s reputation for complying with a contract, a fraction will be
immigrants from other states, and the earlier government has no incentive to
perform marginal contracts when the reputational benefit is enjoyed in part by
unidentified people who do not yet live in the state.47
The remedy – enforcement by federal courts of states’ contractual
obligations – is vulnerable to the futility argument that we applied to federal
contracts. If federal courts compel states to make transfers to state
intergenerational trust funds, the state legislatures might respond by withdrawing
something else. When a state government is forced to comply with a contract, it
45

Dana and Koniak, supra note __, are most uncompromising here.
A problem for Fischel and Sykes, as they recognize. See Fischel and Sykes, supra note __, at
347-48.
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There might also be spillovers to the federal government; see John J. Gibbons, The Eleventh
Amendment and State Sovereign Immunity: A Reinterpretation, 83 Colum. L. Rev. 1889, 1974-75
(1983) (European creditors refused to lend money to the federal government after Mississippi
repudiated an earlier debt).
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will respond by investing less in education or preserving less wildlife. Its
discounting for future generations because of migration cannot be eliminated
unless the federal government took over all the functions of the state
governments. Thus, one conjectures that for this reason federal courts should not
enforce state government contracts. The federal government might be able to
produce collective goods by taxing and regulating citizens directly, that is,
independently of their state residence; but, although the matter is not free from
doubt, it does not seem likely that it can benefit future generations by regulating
state governments as long as these governments retain sufficient residual power.48
III. QUALIFICATIONS AND EXTENSIONS
A. Constitutionalism and the Enforcement of Statutes
Government contract adjudication is not the only judicial behavior that has
an intergenerational dimension. So does the enforcement of statutes and
constitutional rules. One might therefore argue that when a court enforces a
statute, it violates the interests of the current generation, and G2 will respond by
withdrawing value from the trust fund. And when a court strikes down a statute
on constitutional grounds, it must violate the interests of the current generation,
and G2 will respond by withdrawing value from the trust fund. If enforcing
government contracts is futile, then enforcing statutes and constitutional rules is
futile. But this conclusion can’t be right, and therefore by reductio ad absurdum
the critique of government contract enforcement must be wrong.
However, this argument is incorrect. Begin with the formal distinctions:
1.

When a court enforces a government contract, it stays the hand of
Congress at the behest of an earlier Congress.

2.

When a court enforces a statute, it does not stay the hand of
Congress at all.

3.

When a court enforces the Constitution, it stays the hand of
Congress at the behest of the constitutional assembly and the
generation that ratified the Constitution.

Enforcing a statute, like enforcing a government contract, can interfere
with the will of Congress if there is some political cost to repealing the statute.
The better analogy is the entrenching statute, which can interfere with the will of
Congress even if there is no such political cost, as long as the entrenchment is

48

Thus, the much vilified eleventh amendment jurisprudence of the Rehnquist court might be
defensible; but the issues are complex and best treated elsewhere.
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successful – that is, cannot itself be repealed by a majority vote. But ordinary and
entrenching statutes differ from government contracts in a crucial detail.
Recall that the futility argument addressed two separate consequences of
an award of damages for breach of contract: (1) the payment to the victim of
breach; and (2) the transfer to the trust fund. Enforcement of the entrenching
statute might be futile with respect to (2), but (1) can no longer be dismissed.
Imagine, for example, entrenching statutes that impose (constitutionally
permissible) limits on abortion, or, alternatively, that fund abortion providers. A
non-welfarist commitment to preserving the lives of fetuses, or to enhancing the
reproductive freedom of women, is violated by repeal of one statute or the other.
Thus, enforcement of a statute that repeals an entrenching statute could violate a
moral commitment held by the public. By contrast, enforcement of a statute that
breaches a government contract cannot violate a moral commitment. There is no
moral violation if everyone understands that the government does not commit
itself to comply with the contract – or that the government has no moral power to
bind future governments. The victim of breach will be made worse off only to a
morally trivial extent, for that victim knows in advance of the government’s right
to change its policy, can self-insure or refuse to take the contract in the first place,
and (unless already impoverished) incurs a welfare loss less than the gains to
others.49
This argument also applies to constitutional adjudication. The
beneficiaries of constitutional enforcement at the time of adjudication might have
a moral claim, regardless of the consequences for future welfare. Thus, the fact
that the current legislature will adjust to a decision by withdrawing resources to
the future does not count as an objection to enforcing the Constitution. In
addition, constitutional decisions clarify social norms50 and affect the balance of
power between the different parts of the government – effects that have no
analogy in government contract enforcement. Thus, the critiques of government
contract enforcement, and the futility argument on which it is built, have, without
further development, only ambiguous implications for constitutional analysis.51

49

My thesis that courts should not enforce government contracts depends, as I have stated, on the
premise that government contracts are generally intended to enhance social welfare, and not (in
themselves) to vindicate moral commitments. This assumption is much less plausible for statutes.
One can, of course, imagine government contracts that accomplish the non-welfarist goals of
statutes – for example, the government pays abortion providers to supply abortion services. My
argument does not apply to such contracts, but I am not aware of cases involving them either.
50
See David A. Strauss, Common Law Constitutional Interpretation, 63 U. Chic. L. Rev. 877
(1996).
51
There are related arguments in constitutional jurisprudence. For example, John C. Jeffries, Jr.,
The Right-Remedy Gap in Constitutional Law, 109 Yale L.J. 87 (1999), argues that limitations on
money damages for constitutional violations reduces the cost of constitutional innovation, to the
benefit of the future. But Jeffries’ endorsement of injunctions – because they prevent future harms
rather than compensate victims of past harms – is vulnerable to the futility argument, to the extent
that he means to be making a claim about maximizing the welfare of society, as opposed to
vindicating welfare-independent constitutional commitments.

Government Contracts

23

B. Sovereign Immunity
Under the doctrine of sovereign immunity, courts cannot force the United
States government to comply with the law. “The contracts between a nation and
individuals are only binding on the conscience of the sovereign, and have no
pretensions to a compulsive force. They confer no right of action, independent of
the sovereign will.”52 If Congress enacts a law that breaches a contract, a court
cannot order Congress to pay damages. Many commentators criticize sovereign
immunity, and others defend it on public choice or democratic grounds.53 A
futility defense of sovereign immunity follows from our earlier argument, and
there is no need to repeat that argument here. It is sufficient to recall that a court
can do no good, and will probably do evil, by ordering a breaching G2 to pay
damages. If G1 enters a contract, and G2 refuses to comply with it, then if a court
orders it to pay damages anyway G2 will offset the transfer by withdrawing from
the intergenerational trust fund.
It follows that if G1 enters the contract, and also passes a separate law that
obliges the “government” to pay damages if it breaches the contract, the court
should not force G2 to pay damages if it breaches the contract. The same is true
for the Tucker Act, which purports to give courts jurisdiction over breach of
contract claims against the federal government. The Tucker Act cannot bind
future governments. When Congress breaches a contract, the court needs to
reconcile two inconsistent statutes: an earlier statute, the Tucker Act, which
permits contractors to sue the government for breach of contract, and the new
statute, like FIRREA in the Winstar case, which breaches an earlier agreement
and makes no provision for a remedy. Ordinary canons of statutory interpretation
should resolve this issue, balancing the priority of one statute and the specificity
of the other. However the court comes out, Congress should be able to correct
errors by asserting sovereign immunity retroactively, or agreeing to pay damages
in a private bill.54
When an agency (rather than Congress) breaches a contract, the court’s
task is simply to interpret the agency’s authorizing statute.55 Authorizing statutes
usually permit, or are interpreted to permit, agencies to enter contracts but do not
authorize agencies to breach without paying. Courts must decide whether these
statutes are best interpreted to require the agencies to pay damages if they breach;
if so, the Tucker Act supplies federal courts with jurisdiction over breach of
contract suits. The difference between Congress and agencies is that Congress’s
breaches are themselves new laws, and the matter of compensation rests with the
interpretation of those laws; the agencies’ breaches are pursuant to an authorizing
statute and that statute must be parsed on its own terms.
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What needs to be stressed in both cases is that Congress cannot waive
sovereign immunity for future Congresses; it can waive it only for itself, which is
the same thing as saying that it agrees to pay money to someone because of a
moral or political, as opposed to legal, claim.56 On this understanding, the notion
of waiving sovereign immunity is trivial. Waiving sovereign immunity in the
traditional sense – really, one government waiving the sovereign immunity of
future governments – becomes impossible.
C. Corporations, Property Law, and the Dead Hand
One might think that the critique of judicial enforcement of government
contracts would apply to contracts with corporations as well. The shareholders of
a corporation constantly change identities just like the population under a
government. If a past government cannot bind a current government, why should
a past corporation be able to bind a current corporation?
The answer is that the shareholder is not the same as the citizen. Future
shareholders purchase their rights from current shareholders; future citizens do
not purchase their rights from current citizens. Because of this difference, there is
no analogy to the intergenerational trust fund in the corporate context. If the
corporation breaches, and a court compels it to pay damages, this act neither helps
nor hurts future generations of shareholders, for it will be reflected in the price
that the current generation charges them for its shares. It is impossible for
managers to make intergenerational transfers to future shareholders through the
corporation.57
There is an instructive analogy from private law. Property owners
frequently must decide whether to divide their property into smaller interests.
They might divide real property spatially, or extract security interests from real or
personal property, or divide either forms of property temporally by creating time
shares. There are benefits and costs in doing so. The benefit is that people might
in the aggregate value smaller interests more than larger interests; the cost is that
in the future people might find it hard to recombine divided property rights when
it is valuable to do so.58 Whatever these benefits and costs, the standard wisdom is
that people who sell their property have the correct incentives to divide it, because
buyers will pay more or less depending on whether the seller properly anticipates
the cost of reaggregating interests. But this is not true when the owner donates
rather than sells the property. Donors have other interests aside from altruism –
they might want to maintain a family seat, for example – and so choose to divide
56

These arguments might apply to sovereign immunity generally. When Congress tries to bind
itself to some other standard, as through an employment discrimination statute, the Court should
not compel a later Congress to comply with that statute, and, as far as I know, no one has argued
otherwise. See Eule, supra note __. A stickier problem arises if there is a political cost to repealing
the statute, on which see Part IV.
57
This point also applies to assignments of contract rights.
58
See generally Thomas W. Merrill and Henry E. Smith, Optimal Standardization in the Law of
Property: The Numerous Clauses Principle, 110 Yale L.J. 1 (2000).

Government Contracts

25

property in a way that interferes with reaggregation of property interests, even
when their behavior is value-maximizing for future generations.
The purchaser of property is like the purchaser of corporate shares; the
donee of property is like the future citizen. Judicial skepticism about approving
intergenerational donations parallels skepticism about enforcing government
contracts.
D. A Note on Retroactivity
The retroactivity literature discusses changes of government policy such
as a new tax regime replacing an old one. Although at an early stage some
scholars argued that citizens should be protected from retroactive legislation, most
scholars now agree that such protection would be unwise.59 Almost all new
legislation has retroactive effects, even if the statute is not formally retroactive,
and compensation of people who relied on earlier legislation would reduce the
incentive for citizens and firms to anticipate policy changes and invest
accordingly.
As many scholars have observed, breach of a government contract is no
different conceptually from a retroactive change of a law.60 The “contract” is
simply a law that provides a certain distribution of benefits like the original tax
law; the “breach” is a new law that changes that distribution like the new tax law.
Thus, the argument about hold up versus intergenerational opportunism can be
reproduced. Striking down a retroactive statute is like enforcing a government
contract: those who relied are protected from hold up but the earlier legislature is
given greater ability to impose costs on later legislatures.
This literature neglects the futility problem. If the court strikes down a
retroactive statute, then the current government is harmed and the future is
benefited if hold up would otherwise occur; thus, the current legislature will
adjust by withdrawing resources from the trust fund. One might respond that a
prohibition on retroactivity would protect other values; people cannot evade
ordinary statutes as easily as they can avoid entering government contracts. But
when this concern is not present, the futility argument weakens the case for
prohibiting retroactive statutes.
IV. DOCTRINE
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One interpretation of government contract doctrine – the “weak”
interpretation discussed in Part I.A. – is benign. Congress retains the authority to
decide whether to pay damages for breach of contract, but it has delegated the
courts an advisory role. A court decides whether the plaintiff has a right under the
common law of contract, or some version that takes account of the special role of
the government, and then declares its judgment to Congress. Congress then
decides whether to defer to the court or make its own decision on the merits.
This delegation interpretation was advanced by the Supreme Court in early
cases on the Court of Claims, which Congress established in 1855 in order to
divert the flood of private petitions to a body that could resolve claims against the
government in an orderly way. Prior to the establishment of that court, and for a
time afterward, Congress asserted its authority over claims against the U.S.
government, including claims based on breach of contract.61 In 1789 Congress
had authorized the Treasury Department to review claims against the government
with appeal to Congress. On a parallel track Congress accepted petitions for relief
from private citizens, delegating them to committees or executive departments for
recommendations as to their disposition. It was always understand that claims
against the government for breach of contract are moral and political, not legal,
and the 1855 law ratified this understanding by making the judgments of the
Court of Claims reviewable by the Treasury Department. As a consequence, in the
1864 case of Gordon v. United States, the Supreme Court refused to accept
jurisdiction of appeals from the Court of Claims, holding the Court of Claim’s
decisions were not final but instead subject to Congressional reversal. This would
make the Supreme Court’s rulings advisory, in violation of the “case or
controversy” requirement of Article III of the Constitution.62
Over the next years Congress expanded the jurisdiction of the Court of
Claims, reduced its advisory capacities, and appropriated money in advance for
judgments, in the hope that the Court of Claims would seem less like an advisory
body. These efforts met with success when the Supreme Court, noting in
particular that the provision for Treasury Department review had been eliminated,
held that the finality problem had been solved, and that the Supreme Court could
now accept appeals.63 The Tucker Act of 1887 brought together the earlier
provisions in a statute that gave the Court of Claims jurisdiction over a range of
disputes involving the U.S. government.
The system had broken down again by World War II, the result of
Congress’s inability to resist tinkering with the Court of Claims and its
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judgments.64 In the 1950s Congress replaced annual lump sum appropriations
with an “automatic” appropriation, and declared that the Court of Claims was an
Article III court. In Glidden v. Zdanok, the Supreme Court acquiesced in this
judgment. Justice Harlan made it plain in a plurality opinion that despite its
Article III status the Court must rely on the “good faith” of Congress to
appropriate money, which was an admission that Congress has the power not to
pay judgments of the Court.65 In 1977 Congress enacted a “permanent”
appropriation to pay judgments.66
The Glidden case left unanswered important questions about the meaning
of finality, and its role in prior cases like Gordon. In his appendix to Gordon,
Justice Taney objected to Treasury Department review because it left the Court at
the mercy of Congress:
And when the Secretary [of the Treasury] asks for this appropriation [to
pay a claim], the propriety of the estimate for this claim, like all other
estimates of the Secretary, will be opened to debate, and whether the
appropriation will be made or not depends upon the majority of each
House. The real and ultimate judicial power will, therefore, be exercised
by the Legislative Department, and not by that department to which the
Constitution has confided it.67
It was precisely such legislative meddling that led to the breakdown of the Claims
system prior to World War II. But this legislative meddling was not due to
Treasury Department review – that had been eliminated decades earlier. It was
due to Congress’ power to appropriate, which enabled Congress to refuse to pay
judgments. Automatic or permanent appropriation does not solve this problem,
because Congress retains the power to modify appropriations whenever it wishes.
And although Harlan observed in Glidden that Congress almost always paid the
Court of Claims’ judgments, and seemed to think that this tradition was enough to
guarantee that the Supreme Court’s decisions would be final in fact if not in
theory, this observation seems to acknowledge that Congress has the last word.
Thus, Taney’s concern – that an award of damages can be debated and refused by
Congress – remained alive at the time of Glidden, and is alive today. Judgments
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for money damages against the U.S. government are necessarily advisory because
of Congress’ appropriations power.
One is thus tempted to conclude that the benign interpretation is correct,
and that Congress is free to accept or disregard the Court of Claims’ advice –
even after an appeal to the Supreme Court. Government contract jurisprudence is
an exception to the Supreme Court’s general refusal to render advisory opinions.
If this is so, then courts do not enforce government contracts, and the futility
argument advanced in this paper supports current practice. Academics should stop
complaining about the Winstar decision and advice Congress not to pay the
judgment.
The problem is that even if the Supreme Court would not try to force
Congress to comply with a contract or pay damages (for example, by ordering a
government official to refrain from behavior in violation of a contract right or
issuing a writ of mandamus to a disbursement officer),68 the Court might still
regard Congress’ behavior as unlawful, a violation of the Constitution, and be
unafraid of saying so.69 If Congress refused to appropriate funds to pay damages,
or took the more radical step of repealing the Tucker Act with respect to the law
in question, the Court might hold that Congress has expropriated a vested contract
right in violation of the takings clause,70 or legislated retroactively in violation of
the due process clause.71 Despite the absence of a judicial order to pay money
such as a writ of mandamus, Congress might feel compelled to pay damages, for
any number of reasons, including: (1) a conscientious desire to obey the law; (2) a
fear that if it did not obey the law as declared by the judiciary, its legitimacy
would decline in the eyes of the public or important political actors; or (3) a fear
that if it did not obey the law, the Court would retaliate – this is one possible
interpretation of Harlan’s argument – and withdraw jurisdiction of appeals from
the Court of Claims, on the ground that it can no longer regard the judgments as
final. Then the government claims system, finally in working order after decades
of crisis, might collapse.
In order to avoid these costs, Congress might comply with a contract or
pay damages, rather than choose a better instrument for transferring value to the
trust fund, resulting in the bad outcome described in the futility argument.
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Because these costs are imposed by the Supreme Court, only that Court has the
power to eliminate them and hence the futility outcome. How might it do that?
Initially, we must deal with the possibility that the Court is, or feels,
constitutionally compelled to enforce government contracts. If this is the case,
then it will enforce government contracts even if persuaded by the futility
argument that their enforcement is not in the public interest. The futility objection
must be directed to the Constitution itself rather than judicial practice. One would
need to argue that the Constitution should be amended to prohibit courts from
taking jurisdiction of government contracts. Despite precedent in this area – the
Eleventh Amendment – this does not seem to be in the cards, and thus is not
worth discussing.
If, on the other hand, the Court has constitutional authority over
government contract enforcement – that is, if it can decide whether to enforce
government contracts or not – then one can finally argue that the Court should
take account of the futility argument, and refrain from formally holding that the
government has breached a contract when it is that government’s intention to
breach the contract and not pay damages.
How can the Court determine what the government’s intention is? In the
simplest case the government’s intention is embodied in a statute. If Congress
expressly repudiates the Tucker Act’s waiver of sovereign immunity with respect
to a statute like FIRREA, or announces that it will not appropriate money to pay
damages, that statutory declaration might be a sufficient indication to the Court of
Congress’ intentions. The Court should not try to enforce government contracts
by subsequently holding that these behaviors are unconstitutional. It would need
to resist the temptation to extend precedents involving takings and state
government contracts.72
But this might not be enough. Political costs might deter Congress from
overtly breaching a government contract – by repudiating a waiver of sovereign
immunity, or announcing that it will not appropriate money to pay damages –
even when it believes that compliance with the government contract is not the
best way to transfer value to the trust fund. In such cases judicial enforcement of a
government contract – in the sense of the Court announcing that the government
has breached but not trying to compel payment of damages – can still result in the
undesirable behavior identified by the futility argument. Congress would pay the
damages and withdraw from the trust fund.
One solution to this problem would be for the Court to determine
Congress’ intentions in the absence of their expression in the statute; in jargon, to
determine whether a statute implicitly compensates, or refuses to compensate, the
victims of the breach. The Winstar plurality engages in just this reasoning,
although it concludes that Congress did not intend in FIRREA to refuse to pay
damages. A more aggressive reading of the statute that took account of the
political costs of openly expressing such an intention might have reached the
opposite result.
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Another solution would be the radical step of withdrawing federal
jurisdiction of appeals from the Court of Claims. Recall that Congress has the
proper incentives to perform or breach a contract. A traditional court is not needed
in the claims process unless there is some as yet unidentified problem with using a
subordinate legislative or executive body to process claims. Thus, although
withdrawing appellate jurisdiction might damage the claims process in the short
run, eventually the process could be reestablished within one of the political
branches.
Withdrawing appellate jurisdiction would be a radical remedy but would
not be without precedent. It would be radical because it would involve repudiating
not only the Tucker Act as unconstitutional, but possibly also other statutes that
make Congress liable for violating the law, although there are many distinctions
between these statutes and the Tucker Act.73 Yet doctrine supports this approach,
as we have seen. Because Congress has authority over appropriations, judicial
orders to pay damages cannot be final. If they are not final, they are advisory, and
so these judicial orders conflict with the Court’s traditional aversion to rendering
advisory opinions.74 Entrenchment doctrine lends parallel support to this line of
thinking: enforcing a government contract is similar to enforcing a law that
prohibits its own repeal, something that courts have never been willing to do.75
But all of these arguments are more subtle than they appear at first sight, and
involve jurisprudential complexities that the Supreme Court has long avoided;
thus it is unlikely that Supreme Court will withdraw federal jurisdiction over
appeals from the Court of Claims.
A third solution, and the most practical, is that of making it hard for the
government to lose breach of contract cases. The two most important doctrines for
this purpose are the unmistakability doctrine and the sovereign acts doctrine. Both
were discussed in Winstar, so we can discuss these doctrines in the context of that
case.
Start with the unmistakability doctrine. The plurality opinion said that
when the Bank Board promised to permit the thrifts to use the accounting
gimmick, it implied that the U.S. government would pay damages if the law
changed.76 Thus, to avoid paying damages next time it breaches a contract,
73

The Congressional Accountability Act, for example, gives employees claims against members
of Congress, not Congress itself. The Federal Tort Claims Act also does not clearly give claimants
a remedy against Congress.
74
See David P. Currie, Federal Courts: Cases and Materials 9 & n.1 (4th ed. 1990).
75
The Winstar plurality distinguished entrenchment on the ground that Congress is permitted to
violate the contract as along as it pays damages. Winstar, 518 U.S. at 872-873. But it is hard to
imagine the court enforcing the analogous entrenching statute, which would forbid repeal of a law
– say a tax reduction – in the absence of a large payment to a third party. For other cases
discussing this parallel, see Fletcher v. Peck, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch.) 87, 135 (1810); United States
Trust Co. v. New Jersey, 431 U.S. 1, 45 (1977) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
76
Winstar, 518 U.S. at 868-69: “We read [the Bank Board’s] promise as the law of contracts has
always treated promises to provide something beyond the promisor’s absolute control, that is, as a
promise to insure the promisee against loss arising from the promised condition’s nonoccurence.”
In other words, the Bank Board acting on behalf of the U.S. government did not promise to make a
payment to the thrifts if the law changed; but because if they were a private party, they would be

Government Contracts

31

Congress and its agents must explicitly reject this judicially created implication.
The unmistakability doctrine has thus been reversed. While in past cases plaintiffs
had to show that the waiver of sovereign immunity was unmistakable, after
Winstar the government must show that the retention of sovereign immunity was
unmistakable. If the Supreme Court has second thoughts about Winstar, then it
might want to turn back the clock on the unmistakability doctrine.
A future Supreme Court could draw on plenty of materials for this
purpose. Between the Civil War and the mid-1970s,77 the Supreme Court wielded
the unmistakability doctrine with great severity. For example, in the Delaware
Railroad Tax case78 the Court held that a new tax on railroads did not violate a
specific railroad charter that specified the taxes to be paid under that charter. In
Vicksburg et al. v. Dennis79 the Court held that a law taxing a railroad during the
construction of the road did not breach a promise not to tax the railroad company
“until ten years after the completion of the road,” because the language
prohibiting a tax did not cover the period of construction. By requiring great
specificity in the charter or contract, the Court taxes the ingenuity of the early
legislature, which will then frequently leave inadvertent loopholes in the contract
that future legislatures can exploit.
The problem with the unmistakability cases is that they vest the past
Congress with the authority to determine whether the future Congress must pay
damages. All that is necessary is for the past Congress to express itself
unmistakably. It might be hard to do this, but the fact remains that the early
Congress wants to bind the later Congress—that is the essence of
intergenerational opportunism. To free the later legislature from the bond of the
earlier statute, the Court must constantly increase its strictness in response to
increasing legislative exactness, resulting in doctrinal tensions that might be
unsustainable.
A more promising way to handle this problem is the sovereign acts
doctrine, which denies a remedy to the victim of a government breach that is a
public and general law, or a law governing health and morals. This doctrine puts
the emphasis on the autonomy of the later Congress rather than on the intentions
of the earlier Congress. For example, the Court held that a law opening the cattle
slaughter market to competition did not violate an earlier exclusive charter,
because an earlier government cannot bind a later government in the area of
public health and morals.80 And in another case the Court held that a silk embargo
ordered by the U.S. government did not violate a silk procurement contract
because of the public and general nature of the embargo order.81
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The Winstar plurality rejected the application of the sovereign acts
doctrine because FIRREA was not, in its view, “public and general” and, even if
it was, the earlier Congress, through the Bank Board, had promised to incur the
risk of a change in government policy. The confusion here, as the plurality
acknowledged, is that FIRREA was enacted both for a public and general purpose
– it overhauled the thrift regulation system – and with the knowledge that it would
violate the thrift contracts. Of course, nearly all public and general acts will
interfere with prior contracts, and Congress must always know that, for even if
members otherwise would not know of particular violations, the victims will
surely bring them to their attention. The Court might in future cases extract itself
from this morass by reading Winstar to insist on generalized rule of law concerns
– individuals should not be picked on by hostile legislators – rather than as
condemnation of general laws that happen to violate government contracts.
As to the second point, in arguing that the government bore the risk of a
regulatory change, the Court drew an analogy to the private contract law doctrine
of impossibility. Under that doctrine, a party can avoid paying damages for breach
of contract if it did not bear the risk of a supervening, generally unexpected,
event. The court said that the government bore the risk of a regulatory change;
that is why the impossibility doctrine does not apply; and that is why the
sovereign acts doctrine does not come into play. Sovereign acts excuse the
payment of damages only if the government does not bear the risk of them.
The problem with this analysis is by now familiar. The court conflates two
separate governments: G1, which entered the contract through its agent; and G2,
which decided to breach the contract through FIRREA. The common law
impossibility doctrine, by contrast, assumes that the two intertemporal parties are
the same, and thus that a single party through time can act like an insurance
company and pay some amount of money if an unavoidable risk occurs. The
impossibility doctrine directs the court to discover which of the two parties agreed
to bear the risk. But this has no bearing on government contracts, which earlier
governments can use to impose costs on later governments, which are not
compensated with a risk premium. And it interferes with the purpose of the
sovereign acts doctrine, which is to release later governments from the
commitments of earlier governments, regardless of the intentions of the earlier
governments, when police powers or other large questions of public policy are at
stake.
CONCLUSION
If events similar to those underlying the S&L litigation had occurred in the
early nineteenth century, the people with the breach of contract complaint would
not have sued but would have petitioned Congress for redress. Congress had a
good record for complying with contracts,82 and in all likelihood would
voluntarily have paid the complainants damages in order to maintain the
82

See supra note __.
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reputation of the government for keeping its promises. But Congress would have
weighed the value of its ability to make credible commitments, against the $30
billion payment, and would have properly refused to pay if it believed that the
money had a better use. The judiciary would have been uninvolved.
Over many decades Congress has tried to delegate contract disputes to the
federal courts. If it has nonetheless retained the political authority to pay damages
or not as it wishes, then this delegation has done no harm, and, by streamlining
case processing, some good. Contrary to the suggestions of commentators, the
Court should not try to compel Congress to pay damages if it refuses to perform.
But if Congress now incurs a political cost when it refuses to appropriate money
to pay damages ordered by a federal court, then this cost is a harm for all
generations, current and future. The Court should either disclaim appellate
jurisdiction or find a breach of contract only in the narrowest of circumstances.
The critique advanced in this article applies to government contract
disputes, but it has larger implications for the relationship between
Congress and the courts. The simple idea is that when courts defy
Congress in the hope of maximizing welfare across generations – and that
is all that deterring hold up can do – Congress, because it retains the
residual power to control unrelated areas of policy, and because it does not
count future welfare as much as current welfare, will undermine the
judicial decision in a way that makes everyone worse off then if the
judiciary had deferred to Congress. This idea, which stresses the inherent
limitations of judicial enforcement against the government as opposed to
private parties, might stand behind the idea of sovereign immunity, which
has fared so poorly in the academic journals. Judicial power is limited not
so much because the legislative and executive branches are free to disobey
courts – on the contrary, to all appearances the political costs of refusing
to comply with a judicial order would be high. Judicial power is limited
because courts’ efforts to compel the political branches to promote welfare
along one dimension, are too easily undermined by offsetting behavior
along other policy dimensions, behavior that is invisible to courts and
outside their control.
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